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Abstract—A novel framework for sharing common randomness
and generating secret keys in wireless networks is considered.
In particular, a network of users equipped with pulse oscillators
(POs) and coupling mechanisms in between is considered. Such
mechanisms exist in synchronized biological and natural systems,
and have been exploited to provide synchronization in distributed
networks. We show that naturally-existing initial random phase
differences between the POs in the network can be utilized to
provide almost identical common randomness to the users. This
randomness is extracted from the synchronization time in the
network. Bounds on the entropy of such randomness are derived
for a two-user system and a conjecture is made for a general n-user
system. Then, a three-terminal scenario is considered including
two legitimate users and a passive eavesdropper, referred to as
Eve. Since in a practical setting Eve receives pulses with propa-
gation delays, she can not identify the exact synchronization time.
A simplified model is then considered for Eve’s receiver and then
a bound on the rate of secret key generation is derived. Also, it
is shown, under certain conditions, that the proposed protocol
is resilient to an active jammer equipped with a similar pulse
generation mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security methods provide an alternative to
conventional encryption schemes in order to ensure security in
wireless networks [1]. Alternatively, they can be deployed to
exchange secret keys between the nodes in order to complement
the higher layer encryption schemes. The fundamental works
of [2], [3] established the use of common randomness for
secret key generation. An important question is then how to
generate common randomness at the nodes in order to utilize
such protocols in wireless networks. To this end, properties of
wireless links, such as channel gain and delay are shown to
provide a great source for the common randomness, which have
recently received significant attention [4].
There are several challenges, however, to standardize
channel-based secret key generation protocols. A common as-
sumption in such protocols is the channel reciprocity between
the legitimate parties [5], [6]. This would require a perfect
synchronization to avoid phase and frequency mismatch be-
tween the wireless nodes which is often hard to ensure in
distributed networks [7]. Furthermore, if the nodes are static,
then with no channel variations the amount of secret key bits
that can be generated will be limited. To resolve this, induced
randomness can be introduced in wireless nodes to increase
the rate of secret key generation [8]. However, in general, such
channel-based secret key generation protocols require an extra
level of key reconciliation over the public channel to ensure
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the generated keys match at both ends. This would require an
entire standardization of channel coding andmodulation for this
purpose which would make a barrier in deploying such methods
in practice.
We recently proposed a novel approach to implementation
of physical layer security by exploiting coupling dynamics in
the network [9]. Such coupling dynamics are already being
used for synchronization in wireless networks. In particular, we
suggested to use coupled oscillators to implement the proposed
approach in radio-frequency (RF) front end [9]. It is well-
known that a network of RF coupled oscillators converges
within nanoseconds to a steady-state condition provided that
initial free-running frequencies are within a certain locking
range [10], [11]. However, such coupling dynamics, such as
electromagnetic coupling, are often limited to short distance
ranges for this specific application.
In this paper, we propose to exploit synchronization mech-
anisms based on pulse-coupled oscillators in order to securely
generate random keys in distributed networks. The proposed
methods do not require extra processing, e.g., the shared ran-
domness is almost identical at the nodes, and extra hardware
to generate randomness. They also do not require channel ran-
domness and consequently, assumptions on channel reciprocity.
The naturally-existing random phase differences between the
wireless nodes, prior to synchronization, would serve as the
source of common randomness. It is shown, under a simplified
model for the eavesdropper, that a positive-rate secret key
can always be guaranteed. Furthermore, the resilience of the
proposed protocol to certain jamming attacks is discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
some background on pulse-coupled oscillators and secret key
generation is provided. In Section III the system model is
formulated. In Section IV bounds on the entropy of shared
common randomness are derived. In SectionV secret key gen-
eration rate in the presence of Eve is characterized. Resilience
of the proposed protocols to jamming attacks is discussed in
SectionVI. Finally, the paper is concluded in SectionVII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Pulse coupled oscillators
A pulse oscillator (PO) is characterized using a state variable
xwhich increasesmonotonically toward a normalized threshold
of x “ 1. In the model considered in [12], x evolves as x “
fpφq, where φ is the normalized time that increases from 0 to
1. Also, fp0q “ 0 and fp1q “ 1. The PO transmits a pulse,
which can be ideally considered as a delta function with width
0, once its state x reaches 1. Then φ is reset to 0. The function
f is assumed to be concave down and strictly increasing, i.e.,
2f 1 ą 0 and f2 ă 0 over r0, 1s. Also, we assume that f is semi-
diffrentiable at 0 and 1, and hence f 1 is bounded over r0, 1s. An
example of x in an electrical system is the charge of a capacitor
in a resistor-capacitor (RC) circuit as a function of time. This
matches with the Peskin model [13], which considers fpφq “
cp1´ e´γφq, where c, γ are constants.
Networks of coupled POs naturally exist in synchronized bi-
ological and natural systems [12], [13], and have been exploited
to provide synchronization in distributed wireless networks [7].
Such a network is modeled as follows. Suppose that each node
in the network is equipped with an identical PO. Let ǫ P p0, 1q
be a fixed parameter. When a node V receives a pulse from
one of its neighbors, denoted by U , in the network, its dynamic
changes as follows. If the current state of V , xV , is at least
1 ´ ǫ, then it is changed to xV “ 1 and a pulse is transmitted
by V right away. This implies that U and V are synchronized.
Otherwise, when xV ă 1 ´ ǫ, the state of V is changed to
xV ` ǫ, i.e., its phase φ is changed to φ
1 “ f´1pfpφq` ǫq. This
can be thought as applying an extra charge of ǫ to V ’s capacitor
upon arrival of an external pulse. For simplicity, suppose that
the network is fully connected, in which case when two nodes
become synchronized, they stay synchronized moving forward.
It is proved in [12] that, for any n, network synchronization
occurs in a fully connected network of n identical POs, i.e.,
all the nodes synchronize to each other, except for a measure-
zero set of initial phases pφ1, φ2, . . . , φnq, where φi is the initial
phase of the i-th PO.
B. Secret key generation
Secret key generation protocols aim at securely establishing
random keys between legitimate parties using common ran-
domness. In this paper, we mostly focus on a case involving
two legitimate parties Alice and Bob together with a passive
Eve. In particular, a three-terminal source-type model is con-
sidered. Such model, in general, can be described as follows.
Let X P X , Y P Y , and Z P Z denote Alice’s, Bob’s,
and Eve’s observations, respectively, where X , Y , and Z
are the corresponding alphabets. Following the convention, let
capital letters denote the random variables and small letters
denote their instances. In the considered source-type model,
X,Y, Z are distributed according to a joint probability distri-
bution pX,Y,Z . The goal for Alice and Bob is to agree on a
shared secret key K , based on their observations X and Y
using an arbitrary number of communication rounds over a
public channel with unlimited capacity. Such process is tightly
related to Slepian-Wolf compression. The connection is useful
for designing the so-called key reconciliation stage of secret key
generation protocols using cosets of practical error-correcting
codes. The security of K is measured in an information-
theoretic sense given Eve’s observation Z and all the public
interactions between Alice and Bob. The two-user secret key
capacity, denoted by SpX ;Y |Zq, is bounded as follows [3,
Theorem 2 and 3]:
maxtIpX ;Y q ´ IpX ;Zq, IpY ;Xq ´ IpY ;Zqu ď SpX ;Y |Zq
ď mintIpX ;Y q, IpX ;Y |Zqu.
(1)
Such results were later extended to multiple-terminal scenarios
[14]. Furthermore, an exact characterization was derived for a
case in which only one round of communication occurs from
Alice to Bob [2, Theorem 2].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a fully connected network where the network
nodes are equipped with identical POs. Suppose that each PO
starts with a random phase that is uniformly distributed over
r0, 1s. Then the POs enter a dynamic system as described in
Section II-A. Each node counts the number of pulses its PO
transmits till network synchronization occurs. The network
synchronization can be identified by individual nodes once no
external pulses are received between two consecutive pulses.
Each node saves this number as the common randomness. The
following lemma shows that all the nodes observe the same
number, up to a difference of 1. Let mi denote the number of
pulses that the node Vi, for i “ 1, 2, . . . , n, has transmitted so
far at a given time.
Lemma 1: For any i, j, we have |mi ´mj | ď 1.
Proof: The proof is by noting that before Vi and Vj
become synchronized, it is not possible that Vi transmits two
consecutive pulses without Vj transmitting any pulse in be-
tween. In fact once Vi sends a pulse, we have φi “ 0, while
φj ą 0. Now, since f
´1pfpφq ` ǫq is a strictly increasing
function, we have φj ą φi which holds when pulses external to
Vi and Vj arrive as well. This holds till φj “ 1, in which case
Vj sends a pulse before Vi sends the next one.
The lemma implies that the number of pulses that each PO
counts till network synchronization occurs can serve as a source
of almost noise-free common randomness.
Let us refer to a time-interval during which each of the POs
send one pulse as a full cycle. Then time is split into non-
overlapping and consecutive full cycles. Note that since the time
between two consecutive pulses by each of the POs keep chang-
ing, we can not define a full cycle as a fixed time interval. Due to
delays in propagation of pulses, an external user/eavesdropper
can not exactly identify when synchronization occurs. Under
propagation delays, and assuming the delays between POs is
less than half the time unit, the synchronization still occurs for
n “ 2 [15], and under certain conditions for general n [15] and
also for locally connected networks [16]. To this end, a certain
refractory period ρ is defined and a PO does not update its state
for ρ seconds right after it sends a pulse.
Motivated by practical considerations of propagation delays
we describe Eve’s observation as follows. During each full
cycle, Eve receives n delayed pulses from the n POs. Then she
can process the timings between received pulses, compare them
with her estimates of propagation delays with each of the nodes,
and also compare the timings with previous full cycles. Taking
all these information into account to model Eve’s receiver is not
an easy task. Instead, we consider s simplified binary symmetric
channel-type model for Eve as follows. Let a binary random
variable S indicates whether all nodes are synchronized in the
current full cycle or not, e.g., if synchronization occurs/has
occurred, then S “ 1 and otherwise, S “ 0. Then Eve observes
Z “ S with probability 1´ p, and Z “ 1´ S with probability
3p, for some p P p0, 1{
2
q. Also, we consider a memoryless model,
in which Eve’s observation noise Z ‘ S is independent across
different full cycles.
Most of prior work on physical layer security involves a
passive eavesdropper. In our proposed framework, an active
eavesdropper may try to act as a legitimate node of the network
by deploying similar pulse-coupling mechanisms in order to
detect the synchronization time which will be used for key
generation. However, such a malicious act can be detected by
other nodes assuming they know the total number of nodes in
the network. In this paper, we do not formulate such active
eavesdroppingmethods and leave it for future work. There may
exist, however, another type of adversary interested in jamming
the proposed protocol by randomly/selectively sending pulses
into the network in order to prevent synchronization. We model
this scenario by assuming that the jammer has the same pulse
generation mechanism as other nodes in the network, i.e., it can
send at most one pulse during each full cycle. Also, suppose
that legitimate nodes can not distinguish between pulses sent
by other legitimate nodes and the jammer. We will show that
synchronization may not occur and provide an upper bound on
the probability of such event in SectionVI.
IV. ENTROPY OF SHARED RANDOMNESS VIA
PULSE-COUPLED SYNCHRONIZATION
Let M denote the random variable that represents the total
number of pulses before synchronization. In order to simplify
the formulation, we take the maximum of the counted pulses
by POs as the shared randomnessM , knowing that each of the
POs has counted eitherM orM ´ 1 pulses. At the end of this
section, we discuss how such inconsistency can be resolved.
Let tpiu
8
i“1 denote the probability distribution of M , where
pi “ Pr tM “ iu. The goal is to upper bound and lower bound
pi’s in order to provide bounds on the entropy ofM .
We consider only two nodes. For two oscillators, we show
that, roughly speaking, the probability distribution of the num-
ber of pulses before synchronization occurs behave like a
discretized exponential distribution.
Similar to [12], let
hpτq
def
“ f´1pǫ` fp1´ τqq, Rpτq
def
“ hphpτqq. (2)
Let δ “ 1´ f´1p1´ ǫq. Then the domain of h is pδ, 1q and the
domain of R is pδ, h´1pδqq.
Let φ, φ ` τ denote the initial phases of the two POs, where
0 ă φ ă φ` τ ă 1. If τ ď δ, i.e., fp1´ τq ě 1´ ǫ, then the
two POs synchronize after the next pulse. Otherwise, the phase
difference, after the first pulse is sent, become hpτq, where hp.q
is defined in (2). Hence, Rpτq is the phase difference after the
full cycle. Then it is shown in [12, Proposition 2.2.] that R has
a fixed point τ˚ that is a repeller, i.e., for τ ă τ˚, Rpτq ă τ ,
and for τ ą τ˚, Rpτq ą τ . Furthermore, it is shown in [12,
Lemma 2.1] that h1 ă ´1 andR1 ą 1 over their domains. Since
f 1 is bounded over r0, 1s, it can be shown that, sup |h1| ă 8,
inf R1 ą 1, and supR1 ă 8 over their domains. Then let
λ0
def
“ 1{| suph1|, λ1
def
“ 1{ supR1, λ2
def
“ 1{ inf R1, (3)
where 0 ă λ1 ă λ2 ă 1, and λ0 ą 1 by [12, Lemma 2.1]. Let
also τ˚ denote the fixed point of R.
Lemma 2: There exists an increasing sequence of tτiu
8
i“1 and
a decreasing sequence of tτ 1iu
8
i“1 such that
‚ (i) limiÑ8 τi “ limiÑ8 τ
1
i “ τ
˚.
‚ (ii) For initial phase difference τ P rτi, τi`1s Y rτ
1
i`1, τ
1
is,
we haveM “ i.
Proof: Let τ0 “ 0, τ
1
0 “ 1, τ1 “ δ, τ
1
1 “ h
´1pδq, where
δ “ 1 ´ f´1p1 ´ ǫq. Then for i ě 1, let τi`1 “ R
´1pτiq
and τ 1i`1 “ R
´1pτ 1iq. To prove the first condition, note that
τ˚ is also a fixed point for R´1. Also, since R is a repeller,
R´1 is a contraction mapping. Hence, piq follows. The proof
of the second part is by induction on i. Note that if the initial
phase diffrence τ is in r0, δs, then synchronization occurs after
the first pulse is sent. Hence, M “ 1. If τ P rh´1pδq, 1s, then
after the first pulse the phase difference becomes hpτq P r0, δs.
Hence, synchronization occurs after each of the POs send one
pulse and again, M “ 1. Now, suppose that τ P rτi, τi`1s Y
rτ 1i`1, τ
1
is, where i ą 0. After a full cycle the phase difference
becomesRpτq which belongs to rτi´1, τis Y rτ
1
i , τ
1
i´1s, and the
proof follows by induction hypothesis.
Let
ai “ τi ´ τi´1, bi “ τ
1
i´1 ´ τ
1
i , (4)
for any i ě 1, where tτiu and tτ
1
iu are as introduced in the proof
of Lemma2. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3: Assuming that the initial phase difference is
uniform we have pi “ ai ` bi, where pi “ Pr tM “ iu.
Lemma 4: For any i ě 2, λ1pi´1 ď pi ď λ2pi´1, where
λ1, λ2 are defined in (3).
Proof: Let τ “ τi, for some i ě 2, where tτiu is defined
in the proof of Lemma2. Then we have
ai “ τ ´Rpτq, ai´1 “ Rpτq ´RpRpτqq,
where taiu is defined in (4). Since R is a continuous and
differentiable function, then by the mean value theorem, there
exists c P rτ, Rpτqs such that
R1pcq “
RpRpτqq ´Rpτq
Rpτq ´ τ
“
ai´1
ai
.
Then by definition of λ1, λ2 in (3) we have
λ1 ď
ai
ai´1
ď λ2.
The same argument can be applied to bi’s and then the lemma
follows by Corollary 3.
Note that Lemma4 implies that the distribution of M re-
sembles a discretized exponential distribution, i.e., pi decays
exponentially fast as i grows. In particular, it is shown in the
next proposition that M has a bounded entropy. It is assumed
that p1 ă 1{e « 0.37. If p1, and possibly p2, are greater than
1{e, then we can exclude them, apply the following proposition
to the rest of pi’s, and add the terms corresponding to p1 and p2
inHpMq as constants.
Proposition 5: In the two-user pulse coupling system, we
have
gpcq
1´ λ1
`
cgpλ1q
p1 ´ λ1q2
ď HpMq ď
gpcq
1´ λ2
`
cgpλ2q
p1´ λ2q2
,
where gpxq “ ´x log x, λ1, λ2 are defined in (3), and c “ p1 “
1` δ ´ h´1pδq.
4Proof: By Lemma4 we have p1λ
i´1
1
ď pi ď p1λ
i´1
2
.
Then the proof follows by the definition of entropy function
Hp.q and noting that gpxq “ ´x log x is increasing for x ď
1{e.
Remark1.We conjecture that in a general set-up consisting of
n POs, HpMq “ Oplog nq. More specifically, we believe it
can be shown that after Opnq full cycles the POs are split into
Op1q clusters, each consisting of synchronized POs. Then one
can only analyze the entropy of shared randomness involving a
constant number of POs and use the bound on the entropy of
sum of two random variables to prove the conjecture.
Remark2. In order to resolve the possible difference of 1
between counted pulses by the two users, a simple key reconcil-
iation method can be deployed as follows. Users will exchange
their observations modular 3. Then if there is a difference, the
user with smaller observation increments it by 1 which would
make it an error-free common randomness. In general, if we
want to recover from a larger difference, up to a certain d,
between observations, e.g., due to an initial phase difference
of more than one unit of time, the same procedure can be de-
ployed. In that case, users exchange their observation modular
2d` 1 using which reconciliation can be done.
V. SECRET KEY RATE
A three-terminal model, as described in Section II-B, is con-
sidered. The common randomness M between Alice and Bob
is generated according to the process discussed in Section IV
with a slight modification as follows. In order to avoid long
waiting times, Alice and Bob set a fixed threshold m˜. They
continue to send pulses until each of them sends m˜ pulses,
regardless of whether synchronization has occurred or not, at
which point they stop the current session. Then they may start
a new session with new initial random phases, e.g., by simply
reseting their POs, and the same process will be repeated. If
synchronization has occurred at some point during the session,
then the common randomness M is the number of pulses till
that point. Otherwise,M “ m˜. In other words, the probability
distribution pp1, p2, . . . q, characterized in Corollary 3, is trun-
cated as follows. For i “ 1, 2, . . . , m˜ ´ 1, PrtM “ iu “ pi,
and PrtM “ m˜u “
ř8
i“m˜ pi. Also, for i ą m˜, PrtM “
iu “ 0. Furthermore, we assume that the common randomness
M is identical at Alice and Bob, i.e., X “ Y “ M , and
X “ Y “ t1, 2, . . . , m˜u.
Remark3. In order to recover from possible differences be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s observations a procedure, as discussed
in Remark 2, can be deployed. Since M mod p2d ` 1q is
then revealed to Eve, Alice and Bob take t M{p2d` 1qu as
the common randomness. The bounds provided in this section
can be also modified to reflect this extra step, however, we
keep assuming M as the common randomness to simplify
derivations.
Eve’s observation Z , according to the model described in
Section II-A, is as follows. Let S “ tSiu
m˜
i“1 denote the syn-
chronization indicator sequence, where Si is the indicator of
synchronization in the i-th full cycle, as defined in Section III,
for i “ 1, 2, . . . , m˜. Note that ifM “ m, then we have Si “ 0,
for 1 ď i ă m, and Si “ 1, for m ď i ď m˜. Then
Z “ pZ1, Z2, . . . , Zm˜q, where Zi “ Si ‘ Qi, and Qi’s are
i.i.d. with Berppq, where p is the model parameter described in
Section III.
In general, when X “ Y “ M in the three-terminal model,
the lower and upper bounds in (1) match. Hence, the secret key
capacity, which can be denoted by SpM |Zq, is given as follows:
SpM |Zq “ HpMq ´ IpM ;Zq “ HpM |Zq. (5)
Since the complexity of the exact computation of HpM |Zq
is exponential in terms of m˜, we provide a lower bound on
SpM |Zq in terms of the parameters of the coupling system as
well as Eve’s parameter p. The lower bound shows that the
secret key rate SpM |Zq is strictly positive regardless of the
choice for m˜. The following lemma is useful to derive such a
bound.
Lemma 6: For anym1,m2 P t1, 2, . . . , m˜u we have
PrtZ|M “ m1u
PrtZ|M “ m2u
ě p
p
1´ p
q|m1´m2|,
for any instance of Z .
Proof: Let tsi,ju
m˜
i“1 denote the synchronization indicator
sequences formj , j “ 1, 2. Also, note that
PrtZ|M “ mju “ Π
m˜
i“1PrtZi|Si “ si,ju.
This together with noting that tsi,1u and tsi,2u differ in exactly
|m1 ´ m2| positions, and the assumption on the noise Qi “
Zi ‘ Si (i.i.d. with Berppq) complete the proof.
Proposition 7: For the considered three-terminal model with
common shared randomnessM the secret key rate SpM |Zq is
lower bounded as
SpM |Zq ě logmint
1
1´ δ1
, 1` p1´ λ2qδ2
1´ δm˜2
1´ δ2
u, (6)
where δ1 “ λ1p{p1 ´ pq, δ2 “ λ
´1
2
p{p1 ´ pq, and λ1, λ2 are
defined in (3).
Proof: For anym0 P t1, 2, . . . , m˜u, using the Bayes’ rule
and the law of total probability we have
PrtM “ m0|Zu “
PrtZ|M “ m0uPrtM “ m0uřm˜
m“1 PrtZ|M “ muPrtM “ mu
.
(7)
By plugging the bounds from Lemma6 and Lemma4 in (7), for
m0 P t1, 2, . . . , m˜´ 1u we have
PrtM “ m0|Zu ď 1{
8ÿ
i“0
λi1pp{1´ pq
i “ 1´ δ1, (8)
for any instance of Z . And, similarly, for m˜ we have
PrtM “ m˜|Zu ď 1{
`
1`
m˜´1ÿ
i“1
λ´i
2
pp{1´ pqip1´ λ2q
˘
“ 1{
`
1` p1´ λ2qδ2
1´ δm˜2
1´ δ2
˘
,
(9)
where we again used bounds from Lemma6 and Lemma4 in
(7) while noting that PrtM “ m˜u “
ř8
i“m˜ pi.
As stated in (5), SpM |Zq “ HpM |Zq. Note that for any two
random variablesM,Z , we have
HpM |Zq ě ´ logmax
m,z
PrtM “ m|Z “ zu.
5This together with bounds in (8) and (9) complete the proof.
Remark4. Note that the second term over which minimization
of (6) takes place is increasing with m˜. Therefore, the lower
bound provided in Proposition 7 is non-decreasing with m˜.
Hence, the secret key rate, in terms of bits/session, is strictly
positive regardless of m˜ and is actually bounded away from 0 as
m˜ Ñ 8. Also, there is a certain threshold such that increasing
m˜ beyond that threshold does not improve the lower bound of
(6). It would be interesting to see if the actual secret key rate
SpM |Zq exhibits the same behavior.
Remark5. Here, we do not discuss a coding method for Alice
and Bob to extract a secure key K from M in an information-
theoretic sense, i.e., IpK;Zq being small. In particular, since
HpMq is bounded, as shown in Section IV, there is no asymp-
totic behavior for such information-theoretic arguments. One
has to consider several sessions between Alice and Bob and
then apply standard key extraction techniques, e.g., using polar
codes [17], to a sequence of shared symbols Mj’s. Alterna-
tively, an ad-hoc solution is also possible by simply applying a
linear transform, e.g. a polarization matrix [18], to the sequence
tSiu
m˜
i“1 in one session. Although Si’s are not independent, an
argument similar to [19, Proposition 3] can be used to show
that compression of M and also extracting a secure K can be
done to some extent (Again, no concrete results can be made
here as there is no asymptotic behavior). Such solutions are
low complex and can be locally and identically performed by
Alice and Bob without any need for further communication.
The details are left for future work.
VI. RESILIENCE AGAINST JAMMING ATTACKS
Consider a two-user scenario where legitimate users want to
establish synchronization and to extract a common randomness,
as discussed in Section IV. Suppose that there is a jammer
present in the network equipped with a similar PO, as modeled
in Section III.
Let λ0 be as defined in (3). This parameter is frequently
used throughout this section. Let τ denote the phase difference
between the two POs at the beginning of a full cycle. If there
is no jammer, then the phase difference becomes Rpτq at the
end of the full cycle, as discussed in Section IV. In the presence
of a jammer, the dynamic may change as will be described in
the following lemma. Note that in the remaining of this section
we discard specifying the domains of h and R and assume the
following: if τ ą 1, then hpτq is replaced by 0; if τ ą h´1pδq,
then Rpδq is replaced by 1; if τ ă δ, then hpτq is replaced by 1
and Rpτq is replaced by 0, where δ is defined in Section IV as
δ “ 1´ f´1p1 ´ ǫq.
Lemma 8: Let τ, τ 1 denote the phase differences at the
beginning and at the end of a full cycle. Then
τ 1 P
“
h
`
λ0hpτq
˘
,maxtRpλ0τq, λ0Rpτqu
‰
,
where h, R, and λ0 are defined in (2), and (3), respectively.
Proof: There are three possible scenarios for the arrival
time of jammer’s pulse during one full cycle in terms of how
many pulses, either 0, 1, or 2 pulses, have been sent in that
cycle. Consider the first case where jammer’s pulse arrives at
a time t before any of the two POs send a pulse. Let φ, φ ` τ
denote the phases of the two POs at time t. Then the phases
change to hp1´ φq, hp1´ φ´ τq right after t (Note that h is a
decreasing function with h1 ă ´1). Since h is a continuous and
differentiable function, then by the mean value theorem, there
exists c P rφ, φ` τ s such that
1 ă
hp1´ φ´ τq ´ hp1´ φq
τ
“ ´h1p1 ´ cq ď λ0.
Hence, the phase difference τ is scaled by at most a factor of
λ0 ą 0. Since R “ hphp.qq is an increasing function, the phase
τ 1 at the end of full cycle is at most h
`
hpλ0τq
˘
“ Rpλ0τq.
Similarly, if t is after both users have sent a pulse, then τ 1 is at
most λ0h
`
hpτq
˘
“ λ0Rpτq. And if t is after one of the users
has sent a pulse, then τ 1 is actually reduced and lower bounded
by h
`
λ0hpτq
˘
. This completes the proof.
LetRλpτq
def
“ h
`
λhpτq
˘
. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9: There exists at most one fixed point for each
of the functions Rλpτq, λRpτq, and Rpλτq, for any λ ą 1.
Furthermore, if Rpλδq ă δ, then Rλpτq, λRpτq, and Rpλτq
have exactly one fixed point.
Proof: Since R1 ą 1 and h1 ă ´1 over their domains,
the derivatives of Rλpτq, λRpτq, and Rpλτq are also greater
than 1 over their domains. Hence, the first part follows. Now, let
F pτq “ Rpλτq ´ τ . Note that the domain of R is pδ, h´1pδqq
and it can be observed that F ph´1pδqq ą 0. Now, if Rpλδq ă δ
(equivalent to F pδq ă 0) and since F 1 ą 0, then there exists
exactly one root for F which becomes a fixed point for λRpτq.
Since F is an increasing function, then F pδ{λq ă F pδq ă 0 or
equivalently λRpδq ă δ. Therefore, λRpδq has a unique fixed
point using the same argument. Also, note that Rλpδq ă δ and
it can be observed that Rλph
´1pδqq ą h´1pδq is equivalent to
Rpλδq ă δ since h is a decreasing function. Hence, Rλpδq has
a unique fixed point using the same argument.
Corollary 10: Suppose that Rpλδq ă δ and let τ˚λ denote the
fixed point for Rpλτq. Then λτ˚λ is the fixed point for λRpτq
and h´1pτ˚λ q is the fixed point for Rλpτq.
The following proposition is the main result of this section
which shows that synchronization always occurs, under certain
conditions, in the presence of jamming attacks.
Proposition 11: If Rpλ0δq ă δ, where λ0 is defined in (3),
then there exists a τ˚ P pδ, h´1pδqq such that for any initial
phase difference τ with τ R pτ˚, h´1pτ˚qq, synchronization
always occurs in the presence of the jamming attack.
Proof: Let τ˚ denote the fixed point ofRpλ0τq, which ex-
ists by Lemma9. Then for any λ, where 1 ă λ ă λ0, the fixed
points of Rλpτq, λRpτq, and Rpλτq belong to pτ
˚, h´1pτ˚qq.
Furthermore, since the derivatives ofRλpτq, λRpτq, andRpλτq
are also greater than 1, they are repeller functions. In particular,
for τ ą h´1pτ˚q, we have Rλpτq ą τ , and for τ ă τ
˚, we
have maxtRpλ0τq, λ0Rpτqu ă τ . The proposition follows by
this together with Lemma8.
The result of Proposition11 can be also interpreted as fol-
lows. Assuming that Rpλ0δq ă δ holds, then synchronization
occurs with probability at least 1 ´ h´1pτ˚q ` τ˚, where τ˚
is the fixed point of Rpλ0τq. Then the results of Section IV
and SectionV can be extended to cases where a jammer is
also present. In fact, we expect that these results will be scaled
by a constant factor as the probability of synchronization and
6perhaps a modification of the parameters of the distribution of
shared randomness is also needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by practical limitations of secret key
generation protocols, we proposed to exploit readily available
synchronizationmechanisms in wireless networks, in particular
pulse-coupled synchronization, for sharing common random-
ness between legitimate parties. The initial random phases of
the POs deployed by the parties serve as the source of common
randomness. Bounds on the entropy of such randomness, which
is almost identically observed by the users, are derived for
a two-user system. Furthermore, a three-terminal scenario is
considered including two legitimate parties and a passive Eve.
Eve’s receiver is modeled and then a bound on the secret key
rate is derived. Also, it is shown that, under certain conditions,
the proposed protocol is resilient to active jamming with similar
pulse generation mechanism.
There are several directions for future work. It is interesting
to generalize the result of Section IV to networks with more
than two users and, in particular, to check the validity the
conjecture discussed in Remark 1. In a more abstract setup and
assuming a central user, this relates to the problem of distributed
secret sharing in multi-user scenarios [20]. The eavesdropper’s
model, described in Section III and investigated in SectionV,
can be extended to take into account memory, imperfectness of
pulses, synchronization error, etc. The model for the jamming
attack, discussed in SectionVI, can be also extended to consider
more general attacks such as a fixed-power interference, send-
ing higher frequency pulses, etc. Furthermore, implementing
the proposed system in front-end antennas, e.g., using setups
similar to [21], is another interesting future direction.
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